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The Czech public pension system is fiscally unsustainable in the long run because of 
population ageing, which is particularly pronounced in the Czech Republic. Some 
parametrical adjustments have been implemented since the beginning of the 1990s, but in 
contrast to other central European transition countries, the Czech pension scheme is still 
awaiting a fundamental reform. An independent working group was established in 2004 to 
analyse the pension reform proposals of the main political parties, and is expected to finalise 
its analysis by mid-2005. Its results will ideally contribute to the pension reform process, 
although the timing of the pension reform remains uncertain owing to political considerations. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
As is the case in many other countries, the Czech public pension scheme is financially 
unsustainable in the long term due to profound population ageing. The adverse nature of this 
expected demographic development will create large deficits in the pension system if it is left 
unreformed. This would in turn lead to an enormous pension debt that could destroy the 
country’s overall fiscal credibility. 
 
This paper looks at the Czech pension system purely from the fiscal point of view. Apart from 
fiscal consequences, there are other macroeconomic areas that can be affected by pension 
systems and their reforms. Much of the literature is devoted, for example, to the links between 
pension systems and the labour market, private and public savings, financial markets or 
potential economic growth.
1 However, for the sake of simplicity and due to space constraints, 
the non-fiscal macro aspects of the pension system have been omitted from this analysis. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 describes the basic characteristics of the Czech 
public pension scheme. Chapter 3 then briefly summarises the previous reforms of the public 
system, including a discussion of parametric reforms implemented by 2004, and the recent 
reform effort that was launched in the middle of 2004, whereby all political parties 
represented in the Lower House of the Czech Parliament submitted proposals for the reform 
of the Czech public pension scheme. This chapter also looks at the work of the independent 
working group that was established to assess the impact of these proposed reforms. Its 
findings can be used by policymakers and those in the political sphere in the search for a good 
and politically stable pension reform. 
 
Chapter 4 looks at the main exogenous parameters that the working group had to agree on 
before starting work on the individual proposed pension reforms. In particular, it was 
necessary to choose a long-term demographic projection. Some long-run macroeconomic 
assumptions also had to be accepted.  
 
Chapter 5 presents the working group’s preliminary findings. So far it has already quantified 
the “no policy change” scenario and some parametrical changes to the current public pension 
scheme. Chapter 6 then briefly describes the major principles of the reform variants as 
formulated by the political parties. Finally, the last chapter contains some preliminary 




2.  Basic characteristics of the Czech public pension system 
 
The Czech public pension scheme is a typical pay-as-you-go (PAYG) financed scheme which 
offers defined-benefit (DB) characteristics. It provides four types of benefits: old-age 
pensions (which consume circa 70% of the total expenditure of the pension system), disability 
pensions (circa 20%) and survivors’ and children’s pension benefits (circa 10% of total 
pension system expenditure). In 2003, 3.21 million pension benefits were paid by the system, 
1.92 million of which were old-age pensions, 0.55 million disability pensions, and 0.74 
million survivors’ or children’s payments. However, the total number of pensioners was lower 
                                                 
1 For discussion on these issues see, for example, Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003), Makenzie, Gerson and 
Cuevas (1997), Kotlikoff (1996), James (1997) or Roseveare et al. (1996). 3
– only 2.56 million – because some pensioners are entitled to receive more than one pension 
(e.g. an old-age pensioner can also receive, under certain conditions, survivor’s benefit). 
 
The public scheme has a universal character, which means that all economic sectors in the 
Czech Republic belong to the same universal public pension scheme. The system is 
mandatory for both employees and the self-employed. However, self-employed persons are 
allowed (by law, and in contrast to employees) to minimise their contributions to the public 
pension system. There is a linear contribution rate which finances the system at the level of 
28% of each person’s gross wage.
2 One-quarter of this rate is paid by the employee, and the 
remaining three-quarters directly by the employer. 
 
The statutory retirement age differs according to sex. Women can retire earlier than men, 
depending on the number of children raised. The statutory retirement age has however been 
gradually rising since 1996 at a speed of two months per calendar year for men, and four 
months per year for women. Therefore, from a starting level of 60 years for men and 53-57 
years for women in 1995, the retirement age is being gradually increased, and will eventually 
reach 63 for men and 60-63 for women by 2013. However, the real retirement age is 
significantly lower than the statutory retirement age, owing to the existence of early 
retirement benefits, which allow people to enter the pension system up to three years before 
they have reached the statutory retirement age. 
 
The average public old-age pension is about 40% of the average gross wage in the Czech 
Republic. Public pensions are not taxed
3 and it is therefore more appropriate to relate the 
average old-age pension to the average net wage, which results in a higher average net 
replacement ratio of about 55%. 
 
From a financial perspective, the public pension system has repeatedly been in deficit in 
recent years (see Table 1). Between 1996 and 2003, the revenue side of the system was quite 
stable in proportion to GDP. The expenditure of the system, on the other hand, has been 
steadily rising with respect to GDP. Therefore, the system has turned from a positive balance 
in 1996 into deficits of around 0.8% of GDP a year. In 2004, the contribution rate was 
increased by 2 percentage points to 28%, which boosted the revenues of the system. A small 
surplus is thus estimated for 2004. 
 










(% of GDP) 
Balance 
(% of GDP)
1996  133.9  129.5  +4.4  8.1 7.8 0.3 
1997  146.3  152.8  -6.5 8.2 8.6 -0.4 
1998  156.3 168.8 -12.5  8.0  8.6  -0.6 
1999  161.8 181.3 -19.4  7.9  8.9  -1.0 
2000  170.5 186.8 -16.4  7.9  8.7  -0.8 
2001  186.0 201.0 -15.0  8.0  8.7  -0.6 
2002  197.7 217.3 -19.7  8.2  9.0  -0.8 
2003  209.6 229.5 -19.9  8.3  9.1  -0.8 
Source: Final State Budget Accounts for given years; Ministry of Finance. 
                                                 
2 Before 1 January 2004 the contribution rate was only 26%. 
3 Only pensions higher than around 12,000 CZK per month (about 70% of the gross average wage) are subject to 
personal income tax. However, less than 1% of retirees receive such high retirement benefits. 4
3. Reforms of the public pension system 
 
The origins of the Czech public pension system can be found at the end of the 19
th century, 
when a mandatory public social insurance system was established by the Austrian monarchy, 
inspired by the Bismarck’s reforms in Prussia. After the Second World War, the public 
pension scheme in the former Czechoslovakia became a PAYG system, since the pension 
capital accumulated in the pre-war pension funds had been depleted and/or defrauded by the 
Nazi regime. After 1948, when the Communist Party took power for the next 40 years, the 
pension system gradually lost its insurance principles and became a strongly redistributive 
instrument. In 1989, at the time of the so-called Velvet Revolution, the former 
Czechoslovakia inherited an inefficient and excessively complex pension scheme that could 
not cope with the expected demographic and economic changes. 
 
3.1  Reforms implemented prior to 2004 
Public pension system reforms implemented after 1989 have been a mixture of systemic and 
parametric adjustments. First of all, the universal character of the public system was 
emphasised, with all the occupational-based preferences in the system being completely 
abolished. Thus, the pension scheme treats all citizens equally, independent of their 
professional or occupational status. 
 
In 1993, a contribution rate at the level of 27.2% was introduced in order to finance the 
pension scheme. Prior to 1993, the costs of the system had been financed by general taxation 
within the state budget. In the first few years of independence, the pension system was in 
surplus. This positive financial development made it possible in 1996 to decrease the rate to 
26%. However, although the contribution rate was increased by two percentage points to 28% 
in 2004, this adjustment had no real impact from the fiscal point of view, since the 
government simultaneously decreased other social contribution rates (financing the 
unemployment insurance scheme) by 2%. Therefore, despite boosting the revenues of the 
pension system, overall fiscal incomes were not affected by this measure. 
 
In 1995, a new public pension system bill was enacted. Most importantly, this law initiated a 
process of gradually increasing the statutory retirement age. The law has also increased the 
number of years that are relevant for calculating individual pension benefits. Before the 1995 
reform, a public pension depended on the best five income years chosen from the last ten 
years before the year of retirement. Since 1996, the decisive period has been gradually rising, 
and is expected to span the last thirty years by 2016. Each year in this decisive period has an 
equal weight for computing the lifetime earnings that determine the level of an individual 
public pension. 
 
In 1997, the system of indexation of public pensions was amended. Since then, the 
government has been obliged to increase public pensions by inflation plus at least one-third of 
the real wage increase. The law however does not specify any upper limit of pension 
indexation. Between 1996 and 2004, the average indexation equalled inflation plus 60% of the 
average real wage increase, which is much more generous than the minimum rate as 
prescribed by law. 
 
Early retirement benefits have also been tightened in recent years. In 2001, the financial 
penalties for early retirement were increased in order to limit growing demand for early 
retirement pensions. This adjustment was successful, as Table 2 illustrates. On top of that, the 
so-called “temporary penalised” early retirements were completely abolished in 2003. Since 1 5
January 2004, only the “permanently penalised” early retirement vehicle has remained for 
those who want to become pensioners up to three years prior to the statutory retirement age. 
Under these conditions, the percentage part of the pension
4 is decreased by 0.9% for every 
three months missing from the statutory retirement age. Under the temporary penalised early 
retirement scheme, the financial sanction used to be abolished once a person reached the 
statutory retirement age. The increase in early retirees in 2003 should therefore be only 
temporary, as many people requested the temporary penalised early retirement before its 
abolition. 
 
Table 2: Share of standard and early retirees in new retirees between 1996 and 2003 
New retirees (numbers)  New retirees (% shares)   
Normal Early  retirees Normal Early  retirees 
1996  48,846 10,868  81.8  18.2 
1997  56,514 24,318  69.9  30.1 
1998  58,299 55,535  51.2  48.8 
2000  39,843 57,051  41.1  58.9 
2001  32,461 31,766  50.5  49.5 
2002  41,617 21,993  65.4  34.6 
2003  47,080 38,524  55.0  45.0 
Source: Czech Social Security Administration 
 
 
3.2  Progress of reforms since 2004 
In spring 2004, the public pension reform process received a new impetus. The tripartite 
coalition government
5  agreed with the opposition
6  that the public pension system reform 
represents an important and unavoidable challenge in the coming years. A special body called 
the “Team of Experts” was established, comprised of two nominees from each political party, 
plus representatives appointed by the prime minister, minister of finance and minister of 
labour and social affairs. 
 
Each political party has specified its own ideas on how the public pension system should be 
reformed. An independent working group has been created to analyse and quantify these 
political pension reform variants. A special position, the co-ordinator, has been created and 
accepted by all members of the Team of Experts to lead the working group. The co-ordinator 
has appointed six experts to the working group, relying mainly on the experts from the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. Apart from that, each 
political party has nominated one or two of its own experts to the working group. 
 
The working group began work at the beginning of October 2004. First of all, it had to agree 
on the main exogenous parameters. In particular, it was necessary to choose a long-term 
demographic projection. Some long-run macroeconomic assumptions also had to be accepted. 
                                                 
4 The Czech public pension consists of two parts. The first is a flat-rate basic pension. This is the same for all 
pensioners, independent of their pre-retirement incomes. In 2004, it amounted to 1,310 CZK per month, which 
corresponded to about 7% of the average wage or around 18% of the average old-age pension. The second part 
of the public pension benefits is called the percentage part. This differs among pensioners according to their pre-
retirement incomes in the decisive period. 
5 The government was created in mid-2002 by the left-of-centre Social Democrats (70 members in the Lower 
House of the Parliament), the centre-right Christian Democrats (21) and the right-liberal Freedom Union (10). 
The Czech Lower House of the Parliament has 200 members. The government has thus a narrow majority of one 
vote over the opposition. 
6 The right-conservative Civic Democrats (58) and the Communist Party (41). 6
The exogenous parameters used are common to all the reform variants in order to maximise 
the comparability of the results of the pension reform analyses. 
 
The demographic and macroeconomic assumptions are discussed in the next chapter. The 
working group has already reached some preliminary results as far as the no policy change 
and some parametric reform scenarios are concerned. These long-term pension system 
projections are presented in Chapter 5. 
 
 
4.  Main exogenous assumptions 
 
As far as the pension system projections are concerned, the most important exogenous 
parameters are the long-term demographic and macroeconomic scenarios, which are presented 
in detail below in sub-sections 4.1 and 4.2 respectively. 
 
4.1  Demographic scenario 
The demographic assumptions are based on the prognosis created by experts at the Nature 
Faculty of the Charles University in Prague in autumn 2003.
7 The prognosis includes three 
scenarios – low, medium and high. The medium variant was chosen for the purpose of 
pension system projections. The main characteristics of the demographic projection are 
summarised in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Main demographic parameters, 2003 - 2100 
Life expectancy (years)  Active migration balance Total fertility rate 
Men Women  (thousands)  Year 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High
2003 1.15  1.19  1.19  72.0  72.4  72.7 78.5 78.8  79.1 10.0  24.0  34.0
2010 1.19  1.34  1.37  73.4  74.1  74.9 79.7 80.3  81.0 7.0  20.0  25.0
2020 1.32  1.51  1.58  75.4  76.5  77.6 81.3 82.4  83.4 10.0  24.9  34.1
2030 1.38  1.57  1.67  77.0  78.7  80.0 82.6 84.0  85.2 10.2  25.9  37.3
2040 1.43  1.61  1.74  78.4  80.4  81.8 83.6 85.4  86.7 10.2  25.7  38.7
2050 1.45  1.64  1.80  79.7  82.0  83.4 84.6 86.7  88.0 10.3  25.4  39.7
2065 1.49  1.68  1.87  81.3  84.0  85.7 85.8 88.3  89.8 9.9  23.9  39.3
2080
1)  --- 1.70 ---  --- 85.8 ---  --- 89.7 ---  --- 25.4  --- 
2100
1) ---  1.73  --- ---  88.0  --- --- 91.4  --- ---  25.3  --- 
Source: Burcin and Kucera (2003): Prognosis of the population development of the Czech Republic for 2003-
2065, Nature Faculty of the Charles University in Prague, 2003. 
1) Based on the demographic projection from December 2004. 
 
It should be noted that considerable uncertainty is attached to demographic projections 
covering time horizons over several decades, since they are conditional on assumptions 
regarding the fertility rate, life expectancy and migration flows. The economic transition may 
further multiply these uncertainties as, for example, the currently extremely low fertility rate 
can probably be attributed to the economic transition. However, it is difficult to estimate the 
length and size of this temporary shock. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, the demographic development in the Czech Republic will 
certainly be affected significantly by the ageing of the population, as Chart 1 illustrates. First 
of all, there will be an apparent decline in the share of economically active people (between 
                                                 
7 In December 2004, at the request of the working group, the authors from the Nature Faculty of the Charles 
University prolonged the medium scenario of their demographic prognosis up to 2150 (data after 2065 are 
demographic projections). 7
20 and 59 years) in the total population from 59% in 2002 to less than 45% by 2050. On the 
other hand, a rapid rise in the share of people over 60 can be expected from less than 19% in 
2002 to almost 37% in the mid-2050s. Ageing will be further intensified by low fertility rates. 
As a result, the share of people aged 19 or less will fall from more than 24% in 1998 to below 
19% at the beginning of the 2030s, before more or less stabilising. 
 
Chart 1 





















































































Source: Based on Burcin and Kucera (2003) 
 
The expected Czech demographic development in the 21
st century is very similar to the 
demographic perspectives of a number of developed economies. However, the speed of 
population ageing in the Czech Republic is striking in the international context, which is 
documented in Table 4. In the next five decades, the Czech Republic ranks as the third-fastest 
ageing country among the OECD economies, leading to a rise in the old-age dependency ratio 
of more than 36 percentage points by 2050. 
 
Table 4: Old-age dependency ratio (persons aged 65 and over/persons aged 20-64) 
Selected OECD countries  2000  2050  Change in 
percentage 
points 
Austria  25.2 58.2 33.0 
Belgium  28.1 49.5 21.4 
Czech Republic  21.8  58.3  36.5 
Finland  25.9 50.6 24.7 
France  27.2 50.8 23.6 
Germany  26.6 53.2 26.6 
Hungary  23.7 47.2 23.5 
Italy  28.8 66.8 38.0 
Netherlands  21.9 44.9 23.0 
Norway  25.6 41.2 15.6 
Poland  20.4 55.2 34.8 
Portugal  26.7 50.9 24.2 
Spain  27.1 65.7 38.6 
Sweden  29.4 46.3 16.9 
United Kingdom  26.6 45.3 18.7 
OECD average  23.8 49.9 26.1 
Sources: OECD (2001) and Burcin and Kucera (2003). 8
4.2  Macroeconomic scenario 
The logic of the long-term macroeconomic scenario is consistent with the principles applied 
by the Ageing Working Group of the European Union’s Economic Policy Committee. The 
growth rate of the Czech economy is, by definition, a result of the employment and labour 
productivity growth rates. The average wage goes hand in hand with productivity growth. 
Therefore, the share of labour income in GDP is constant over time. 
 
Employment depends on three factors: (i) the underlying demographic projection, (ii) the 
projection of participation rates, and (iii) the unemployment rate. The first of these has been 
discussed in the previous chapter. As far as participation rates are concerned, two projection 
methods – static and dynamic – were considered. Whereas the static approach holds the age-
specific participation rates constant over time, the dynamic method takes into account 
different behaviour across generations and allows for different levels of participation rates in 
different generations.
8   Finally, the dynamic approach was used to build up the 
macroeconomic scenario. Regarding the unemployment rate, a gradual decline from 
contemporary levels of over 8% (the ILO methodology) towards 7% is projected. The latter 
level is in line with OECD and EU estimates of the Czech Republic’s structural 
unemployment rate. 
 
The projected labour productivity growth rate is based on the fact that the Czech economy is 
expected to converge to the average labour productivity level in the European Union. Czech 
labour productivity in purchasing power parity reached 59% of the average labour 
productivity of the euro zone (EU-12) in 2003. Thus, in 2003, there was a gap in productivity 
levels of 41 percentage points between the Czech Republic and the EU-12. The convergence 
process, according to the macroeconomic scenario, should eliminate each year 3% of the 
existing productivity gap. The macroeconomic scenario also assumes that average labour 
productivity growth in the EU-12 would be 1.75% p.a. Thus, Czech labour productivity 
growth is given by productivity growth in the EU-12 plus the convergence element. 
 
It is necessary to emphasise that, owing to the very long horizon of the macroeconomic 
scenario, all the above-mentioned trends must be treated as projections, not predictions. The 
macroeconomic scenario purely accentuates the structural relationships between the variables 
and omits any cyclical variations.
9 Cyclical fluctuations will certainly occur; however, they 
are insignificant in the long run. Last but not least, it must be mentioned that, for the sake of 
comparability of different pension reform scenarios and due to the ambiguous results in the 
literature, no link is assumed between the different pension reform strategies on the one hand 
and macroeconomic performance on the other.
10 
                                                 
8 See Burniaux, Duval and Jaumotte (2003) and Scherer (2002) for more details on the estimation of static and 
dynamic participation rates. 
9 The only exception to this rule is the short term (by 2007) of the macroeconomic scenario, which uses the 
macroeconomic predictions of the Ministry of Finance (2004). Therefore, the logic discussed above with regard 
to the macroeconomic scenario applies from 2008 onwards. 
10 The only exception is the projection of participation rates, which are affected by the process of gradual 
increases in the statutory retirement age. If any pension reform strategy increases the retirement age above the 
levels discussed in Chapter 2, it would result in higher participation rates of the pre-retirement age cohorts, 
thereby increasing the overall participation rate. This would stimulate GDP both in terms of levels and growth 
rates. 9
Table 5: Summary of the main variables in the macroeconomic scenarios 




















Labour productivity (Czech 
Republic as a % of EU-12) 
63 74 80 85 89 92 94 96 97 98
Annual labour productivity 
growth 
3.0% 2.8% 2.5% 2.3% 2.1% 2.0% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 1.8%
Annual employment growth  0.2%  0.0% -0.3% -0.7% -0.7% -0.4% -0.2% -0.2% -0.1% -0.1%
Annual GDP growth  3.2% 2.8% 2.2% 1.5% 1.4% 1.6% 1.7% 1.6% 1.7% 1.8%
Source: Working group, macroeconomic scenario. 
 
Table 5 presents the key variables of the macroeconomic scenario and their projected 
development over the coming decades. The average labour productivity growth rate will 
gradually decline from 3% in the first decade of this century to below 2% in the 2060s. This 
corresponds to closing the gap in productivity levels between the Czech Republic and the euro 
area. Whereas in the first decade of projections the average gap is 37%, after 20 years it 
diminishes to 20%. In the second half of the century, differences in productivity levels will be 
less than 10% and will continue to decline. Employment should experience a slight increase 
in the first decade as the gradual rise in the statutory retirement age will outweigh the adverse 
demographic development. In the next decade, both these factors will be roughly in balance 
and employment will stagnate. However, from the 2020s onwards, population ageing effects 
clearly dominate
11 and employment growth turns into negative values. GDP growth is, as 
mentioned earlier, a result of employment growth and labour productivity growth. Even in the 
2030s and 2040s, when negative demographic pressures will be strongest, the drop in 
employment should be more than compensated by productivity growth. Thus, the GDP 
growth rate should remain positive during the entire projection period, close to at least 1.5% 
p.a. in real terms during the period of intensive population ageing. 
 
 
5  Preliminary results 
 
As emphasised in the introduction, this paper purely focuses on the fiscal consequences of the 
public pension system. Thus, it does not investigate potential links between the pension 
system on the one hand and other macroeconomic variables on the other. Neither are the 
microeconomic characteristics of the pension system considered.
12 
 
The working group has so far presented some preliminary results of two pension variants – 
the no policy change scenario and different types of parametric reforms to the current PAYG 
DB public pension pillar. Sub-sections 5.1 and 5.2 comment on the main fiscal consequences 
of these pension scenarios. 
 
5.1  The ‘No policy change’ scenario 
The no policy change scenario stems from the assumption that the current legislative 
framework regarding the pension system remains unchanged over the whole horizon of the 
projection. However, the current legislation gives the government a certain degree of freedom 
                                                 
11 The rise in the statutory retirement age, discussed in Chapter 2, will be completed by 2020. 
12 The working group has defined three microeconomic-based criteria: (i) the individual replacement ratio 
(pension divided by the last pre-retirement wage); (ii) the internal rate of return from the pension scheme; and 
(iii) implicit tax (see Duval (2003) for more details on this topic). These micro-oriented criteria have been 
calculated for different individuals ,varying according to their lifetime earning profile. 10
as far as some important pension system elements are concerned. Therefore, important initial 
assumptions had to be made in the following parameters: 
(i)  Pension benefits indexation: the law stipulates only the minimum rate, which must 
not be lower than inflation plus one-third of the average real wage increase. The 
law does not specify the maximum rate of indexation. 
(ii)  Basic (flat-rate) part of the pension: according to the law, the development of the 
flat-rate component of the pension is set by the government. This parameter is 
important when it comes to calculating new pension benefits. 
(iii)  “Reduction borders” in the pension formulae: unlike the flat-rate component, the 
percentage part of the pension benefits corresponds to the wage of a given retiree 
in the period of his/her economic activity. However, this relationship is not linear. 
There are some income redistribution elements included in the pension system. 
More specifically, the system introduces two so-called reduction borders. In 2004, 
the first of these was set at the level of about 42% of the average wage, while the 
second one equalled 107%. The whole wage of an individual counts for his/her 
percentage pension if the wage is lower than the first reduction limit. Between the 
first and second reduction limits, only 30% of the wage is included in the pension 
benefit formulae, and any wage over the second reduction limit increases the 
percentage pension benefit by only 10%. 
 
Regarding the pension benefit indexation, a minimum rate was chosen (inflation plus one-
third of the average real wage increase). This is in line with the practice implemented in the 
last two or three years. As far as the basic flat-rate component of the pension is concerned, 
full wage adjustment of this parameter is assumed in the no policy change scenario. Thus, the 
flat-rate component of the pension will keep its proportion to the average wage. Full wage 
indexation was also assumed in the case of the reduction limits. Therefore, the no policy 
change scenario expects that the relative intra-generational redistribution of the pension 
system should remain unchanged over the projection horizon. 
 
Chart 2 



































































































Source: Preliminary results of the working group (www.reformaduchodu.cz) 
 
Chart 2 illustrates the development of revenues and expenditures of the public pension system 
under the no policy change scenario. The revenues of the system as a percentage of GDP 
remain constant over time, since no change in the contribution rate is allowed in the 11
scenario.
13 The expenditure projection is affected by the expected ageing of the population. In 
the long run, pension spending will jump by about 5% of GDP to about 13%. 
 
Chart 3 





















































































































Source: Preliminary results of the working group (www.reformaduchodu.cz) 
 
The public pension system is expected to be in a small surplus by the early 2020s, owing to 
recent parametrical changes (increased contribution rates and a gradual rise in the statutory 
retirement age). The assumption of minimum pension benefit indexation also plays an 
important role (only inflation plus one-third of the average real wage increase). However, 
after 2015 this surplus declines until, in the mid-2020s, the system goes into deficit. In the 
long run, deficits could total almost 5% of GDP. 
 
The surpluses from the first two decades of the projection, if invested in the financial 
markets,
14 will amount to more than 4% of GDP by the beginning of 2020s. Then, due to the 
rise in expenditures, deficits would appear. The buffer fund will then have to be gradually 
depleted to cover rising pension system expenditures. The system starts to accumulate debt by 
about 2030. At the end of the century, the overall pension debt could in theory reach 260% of 
GDP.
15 In reality, it can be assumed that annual pension deficits of over 4% of GDP, coupled 
with steeply rising pension debt, would force the financial markets to impose an increased risk 
premium on the economy. This would in turn increase the real costs of financing of 
government debt and further worsen the projected development of the pension debt. However, 
these risk premium effects are not explicitly considered in this analysis. 
                                                 
13 Any increase/decrease in the contribution rate would have to be implemented by an amendment of the law, 
which would be in contradiction to the basic preposition of the no policy change scenario – namely an 
unchanged legislation framework. 
14 A real investment rate of 3.5% p.a. is assumed in the accumulation phase. This corresponds to a portfolio 
invested 50% in government bonds and 50% in stocks. The long-run average real yield of the world’s stock 
markets is estimated at 6% p.a. The long-run average real yield of 10-year government bonds was set at 2% p.a. 
See Siegel (2002), Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2002, 2004) and Global Financial Data Inc. website for 
relevant data. A positive inflation differential of 0.5% p.a. between the Czech and EU-12 inflation rates is 
expected in the macroeconomic scenario, which, under the assumption of convergence in nominal interest rates, 
finally yields the above-mentioned 3.5% p.a. average real rate of return. 
15 When it comes to financing the pension deficit, a 1.5% average real rate of return on 10-year government 
bonds is used. 12
5.2  Parametrical changes to the current PAYG DB system 
This chapter examines how the results of the no policy change scenario would change if some 
parametrical reforms are implemented, and considers three specific scenarios (named 
Scenarios A, B and C). Scenario A demonstrates the sensitivity of the current system to a 
different indexation of benefits.  Scenario B then tests a rise in the statutory retirement age. 
Finally, Scenario C discusses two combined parametrical reforms.
16 
 
A) Indexation of pensions 
Three different scenarios were considered: 
•  wage indexation, 
•  price indexation, 
•  “Swiss” indexation (inflation plus half of the real wage increase).
17 
 
All other important parameters of the pension system remain unchanged in comparison with 
the no policy change scenario. The effect of different indexation strategies on pension 
expenditures is documented in Chart 4 below. 
 
Chart 4 
Source: Preliminary results of the working group (www.reformaduchodu.cz) 
 
The results are in line with intuition. More generous indexation than the one in the no policy 
scenario (inflation plus one-third of the real wage increase) leads to higher pension system 
expenditure, and vice versa. Thus, the wage indexation of pensions would push expenditure 
towards 16% of GDP in the long run, some 3 percentage points above the no policy change 
scenario. “Swiss” indexation would increase pension spending by about 1% of GDP in the 
long run. On the other hand, price indexation, which keeps the real value of pensions constant 
over time, would save 1% of GDP on the expenditure side of the public pension system in the 
long run. 
 
                                                 
16 The working group has also analysed five different adjustments of the pension benefit formulae. These results 
are not included in this paper. Details can be found at www.reformaduchodu.cz (since June 2005 also available 
in English). 
17 Such an indexation has been used in Switzerland for a number of years. In the literature, it is therefore often 
called Swiss indexation. 

































































































Compared to the no policy change scenario, higher expenditures will fully affect the balance 
of the pension system and cumulated pension debt.









































































































Source: Preliminary results of the working group (www.reformaduchodu.cz) 
 
Chart 6 







































































































Source: Preliminary results of the working group (www.reformaduchodu.cz) 
 
More generous indexation shortens the period of temporary surpluses in the pension system 
and deepens the long-term deficits. Consequently, the pension system builds up a smaller 
buffer fund in the first phase and then accumulates higher debts. Price indexation, on the other 
hand, would keep the pension system in surplus by 2030. A buffer fund would help finance 
rising expenditures by 2045. However, pension system debt at the end of the century could 
reach around 175% of GDP, which means that from a long-term perspective, even price 
indexation cannot make the public pension system financially sustainable. 
                                                 
18 The contribution rate in all indexation scenarios remains the same as in the no policy change variant. 
Therefore, the pension system’s revenues are unchanged and constant at the level of 8.3% of GDP. 14
B) Rise in the statutory retirement age 
Three scenarios assuming a further increase in the statutory retirement age were analysed by 
the working group.
19 
•  A gradual rise in the retirement age to 65 years for both men and women. This level 
would be achieved by 2030 in the case of men, and between 2033-2043 in the case of 
women, depending on the number of raised children; 
•  A gradual rise to 67 years for both sexes (2044 in the case of men; 2047-2051 in the case 
of women); 
•  A gradual rise to 69 years for both sexes (2058 in the case of men and 2061-2065 in the 
case of women). 
All other pension system parameters are the same as in the no policy change scenario. 
 
Unlike the indexation strategies, which change the generosity of the pension system, the rise 
in the statutory retirement age mitigates at least partially the negative impact of population 
ageing on the number of retirees. Therefore, a further increase in the statutory retirement age 
lowers the overall pension system expenditures if compared with the no policy change 
scenario (Chart 7). 
 
Chart 7 



































































































Source: Preliminary results of the working group (www.reformaduchodu.cz) 
 
In the no policy change scenario, expenditures will amount to 13% of GDP in the long run. 
Raising the retirement age to 65 would bring them below 12%. In the case of people retiring 
at 67, the pension system should not consume more than 11% of GDP. Finally, the population 
retiring at 69 years should ensure pension spending at around 10% of GDP. The scenario that 
increases the statutory retirement age to 69 years may look perhaps too drastic. However, it 
must be emphasised that the first generations that would retire at 69 are, in this simulation, 
men born in 1989 and women born between 1992 and 1996. In other words, such an 
apparently drastic increase in retirement age would be fully applied to children who are at 
present between 10 and 15. Based on the demographic projection that has been used for all 
pension system calculations, the average life expectancy of these generations would be 
significantly higher than currently observed values. Therefore, even under the most drastic 
                                                 
19 As noted earlier, even the no policy change scenario takes into account some increase in the retirement age (up 
to 63 for men and 59-63 for women, according to the number of raised children), given the currently valid 
legislative framework. 15
(69 year) scenario, the average length of receiving old-age pension benefits should not be in 
any case lower than the average number of years in retirement of current retirees. 
 
Charts 8 and 9 show projections of the pension system’s balance and pension debt. These 
results stem directly from the expenditure projections discussed above and are in line with 
intuition. It seems clear that even raising the statutory retirement age to 69 cannot in isolation 
guarantee the financial sustainability of the pension system in the long run. 
 
Chart 8 


































































































Source: Preliminary results of the working group (www.reformaduchodu.cz) 
 
Chart 9 



































































































Source: Preliminary results of the working group (www.reformaduchodu.cz) 
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C) Combined parametrical reforms 
Two scenarios consisting of simultaneously implementing several parametrical adjustments to 
the current pension system have been analysed by the working group. The first scenario 
(hereafter referred to as Combination 1) gradually raises the statutory retirement age to 69 for 
both men and women. Moreover, it assumes a “Swiss” indexation of pensions and, last but 
not least, keeps the flat-rate component of pensions constant (no indexation) in absolute terms 
at the level of 2005.
20 The second scenario (Combination 2) increases the statutory retirement 
age to 65 for both sexes. Indexation of pensions is the same as in the no policy change 
scenario (i.e. inflation plus one-third of the average real wage increase). In this scenario, the 
flat-rate component of pensions of the new pensioners (retiring after the start of reform) is 
also kept in absolute terms at the level of 2005. All other relevant pension system parameters 
are in both Combination 1 and 2 identical with the no policy change variant. 
 
Chart 10 compares expenditure projections. Both parametrical adjustment combinations 
represent significant spending savings in the long run, ranging from 3 to 4% of GDP a year, if 
compared with the no policy change scenario. 
 
Chart 10 


































































































Source: Preliminary results of the working group (www.reformaduchodu.cz) 
 
Consequently, one can expect higher temporary surpluses or lower long run deficits. This 
hypothesis is confirmed in Chart 11. Both combined scenarios would keep the system in 
surplus for the next 35 years on average, before deficits emerge. Combination 1 will lead to 
lower deficits than Combination 2, since raising the statutory retirement age from 65 to 69 
offers greater savings than decreasing the indexation from the “Swiss” approach to the 
minimum rate guaranteed by law (inflation + one-third of the real wage increase). 
                                                 
20 In the analysis, this is only relevant for the new retirees. The relative weight of the flat-rate component in their 
pension will decrease over time (if compared with current pensioners) due to zero indexation of the flat-rate part 
of the benefits. 17
Chart 11 

































































































Source: Preliminary results of the working group (www.reformaduchodu.cz) 
 
Both combined scenarios will significantly decrease the debt of the pension system over the 
next 100 years. Combination 1 can even completely eliminate this debt, as Chart 12 illustrates. 
In Combination 2, debt of about 45% of GDP could be accumulated by 2100. However, the 
system can quite easily be stabilised given the fact that in the very long run, even a small 
improvement in deficits (surpluses) could have a substantial impact on cumulated debt. 
 
Chart 12 
























































Source: Preliminary results of the working group (www.reformaduchodu.cz) 
 
Therefore, Combinations 1 and 2 represent examples of how the pension system could be 
stabilised in the long run if policymakers prefer parametrical adjustments to systemic pension 
reforms. The next chapter sums up the main elements of the pension reform variants proposed 
by the political parties. 
 18
6.  Pension reform variants 
 
The Czech political parties have formulated their own strategies on how to reform the 
country’s public pension system. The working group was asked to analyse these variants 
independently, placing considerable emphasis on keeping the analysis as comparable as 
possible. Therefore, all the political variants’ calculations will be based on the same 
demographic projections and macroeconomic scenario. The analysis of the working group 
should be finished by June 2005. An English version of the final report will be available on 
the working group’s website (www.reformaduchodu.cz). This chapter summarises all five 
political reform strategies. 
 
6.1 Social Democratic Party 
The Social Democrats asked the working group to quantify the effect of changing the current 
PAYG DB public pension system to an NDC (notional defined contribution) pension 
system.
21 Under this system, PAYG financing would remain unchanged. However, the system 
would become defined-contribution-oriented instead of defined-benefit, as the level of 
pension would be tied up with the contributions paid into the system. The statutory retirement 
age would be gradually increased to 65 for both men and women. The system would however 
allow both to retire up to three years earlier. A minimum pension at the level of 130% of life 
minimum would be guaranteed.22 Indexation of pension benefits as well as the “interest” 
accrued to the notional individual accounts of the contributors would be equal to the growth 
rate of totally paid contributions. 
 
6.2 Christian Democrats 
The Christian Democrats also plan to raise the statutory retirement age to 65. They would 
allow people to partially opt out of the state-managed, PAYG financed pension system. 
People could use 8 percentage points of the 20% “old-age” contribution rate in order to save 
for their own private pensions using the existing private pension funds or life insurance 
companies. Such a switch would be entirely voluntary. Even new labour market entrants will 
have the chance to decide whether they wish to stay fully in the state PAYG DB system or 
switch to a mixture of public PAYG DB scheme and private fully-funded DC pillar. People 
who have switched would of course receive a lower state pension in comparison to those who 
have not switched, since they would have paid lower contributions into the state pension 
system. People older than 50 would not be allowed to switch. 
 
6.3 Freedom Union 
The Freedom Union proposes implementing far-reaching parametrical reforms to the current 
pension system. The retirement age would be increased to 65 by 2030, increasing gradually 
thereafter at a speed of two months per calendar year. The level of new pensions would be 
gradually decreased between 2010 and 2030 from the current level of about 43% of the 
average wage, to about 30%. The link between pensions on the one hand and the total amount 
of contributions paid to the system on the other would also be strengthened. Moreover, like 
the Christian Democrats, the Freedom Union is also thinking of introducing some form of 
voluntary partial opt-out of the PAYG DB system. More specifically, people would be 
allowed to save 2 percentage points (or 3%) of the total 20% contribution rate for their own 
pensions. However, this opt-out rate would have to be supplemented by another 4% (or 6%) 
from their own savings. Thus, this opt-out would be conditional on the availability of private 
                                                 
21 For more details on NDC systems, see for example the Swedish social security system. 
22 The life minimum is defined by the law. Currently, it is 4,300 CZK per month for a single person (circa 140 
euro or 180 USD). 19
savings and the willingness of people to invest at least part of their savings over a very long-
term horizon. 
 
6.4 Civic Democratic Party 
The Civic Democrats intend to change the current PAYG DB system into a flat-rate pension 
system. In a flat-rate system, there is no link between the pension and contributions paid into 
the system. The flat-rate pension would be between 20-30% of the average wage in the 
economy,
23 and the retirement age would be gradually increased to 65. If necessary, a further 
rise to 66 or 67 would also be possible. Cutting the average pension benefits of future 
pensioners should allow the “old-age” mandatory contribution rate to be reduced. A gradual 
decrease from the current 20% of up to 10% is considered. A decrease in the mandatory 
contribution rate would result in an increase in disposable income of those in the labour force. 
According to the Civic Democrats, each citizen should have the right to decide on how to use 
this “extra” money. They can choose either to prefer short-term consumption and then, when 
retired, to receive the flat-rate state pension that would be only marginally above the life 
minimum, or to invest at least part of this money in financial products, real estate, education, 
etc. and thus save for old age. 
 
6.5 Communist Party 
The strategy of the Communist Party regarding the public pension system is to keep the 
current PAYG DB scheme. If necessary, they would implement some parametrical 
adjustments, including an increase in contribution rates. More specific parametric adjustments 
will be suggested after the Communist Party has analysed the results of the no policy change 





The Czech Republic’s public pension system is unsustainable in the long run, a situation it 
shares with most other developed countries. This situation is particularly acute owing to the 
fact that demographic experts expect very rapid population ageing in the next 50 years. 
 
Over the last decade some partial adjustments to the current public pension system have 
already been implemented. This has initiated a process of gradually increasing the statutory 
retirement age. Moreover, some early retirement benefits have been completely eliminated, 
while the financial sanctions for early retirement have been increased. Last but not least, the 
contribution rate to the system has recently been increased. 
 
In spring 2004, all the political parties agreed that, due to the urgent and long-term character 
of public pension reform, they would try to cooperate on this issue and formulate their own 
reform strategies. The independent working group established to analyse these strategies has 
already released some preliminary results (see Chapter 5), and the whole analysis will be 
finished by mid-2005. 
 
It is certainly too early to form any firm or too optimistic conclusions about pension reform in 
the Czech Republic. Pension reform is always a highly political issue and politicians usually 
tend to postpone tough decisions as much as possible. On top of that, there will be general 
elections in June 2006 in the Czech Republic. It may thus happen that (i) pension reform issue 
                                                 
23 Currently, the average old-age pension is about 40% of the average wage. 20
will be misused by politicians in the pre-election campaign, or (ii) a decision on pension 
reform will be postponed until the post-election period. 
 
Both these scenarios would be harmful. The first could damage the credibility of any future 
pension reform. Postponing the decision on reform, on the other hand, would waste a further 
year or two which could otherwise have been used to support reform. The current structure of 
the Czech population is still favourable (there are relatively few old people and numerically 
strong generations in the labour force), but this will start to change quite rapidly in the next 
five to ten years. Further postponing the reform decision is therefore very costly from a long-
term perspective. 
 
Nevertheless, the fact that different potential pension reform strategies will be analysed on as 
comparable a basis as possible is definitely a positive step on the path to reform. The outcome 
of this work should be applicable now as well as in two years’ time. It is clear that the timing 
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